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Contracts-ADOPTION-A FLEXIBLE
STANDARD
FOR DETERMINING
TO MAKEA WILL,INCIDENTAL
TO AN ADOPTION
WHENA CONTRACT
AGREEMENT,
PUBLIC
POLICY-Reimche v. First
IS VOIDAS AGAINST
National Bank, 512 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1975).
Plaintiff, the mother of an illegitimate child, commenced
this diversity action against the executor and legatees of the putative father's estate. She sought specific performance of an alleged
oral contract by the decedent to make the' plaintiff one of the
beneficiaries of his will. This promise and other promises by the
father to benefit the child were allegedly made in return for the
mother's promises to consent to his adoption of the child, to never
attempt to regain custody of the child, and to remain silent about
the parentage of the child during the father's lifetime.'
The Federal District Court for the District of Nevada dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted, finding that the contract was a sale of the child
and void as against public p01icy.~The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the contract was
enforceable and did not violate public policy.

A.

Public Policy, Generally

The concept that a contract violative of public policy is
unenforceable is based on the principle that one cannot lawfully
do that which tends to be injurious to the public elf are.^ Both
because of the practical difficulties involved in identifying and
defining public policy4 and because of the countervailing princi-

-

-

---

1. In addition, the plaintiff alleged that the contract was initiated by the decedent
prior to the birth of the child after the decedent assured the plaintiff that his proposal
was the best way to provide for the child and to insure that the benefits of enormous trusts
created by decedent's forefathers inured a t his death t o the child. Plaintiff accepted
decedent's offer and fully performed her promises. The decedent performed all his promises to benefit the child, but he failed to name the plaintiff as a beneficiary of his will.
IEeimche v. First Nat'l Bank, 512 F.2d 187, 187-88 (9th Cir. 1975).
2. Reimche v. First Nat'l Bank, Civil No. LV-1923 (D. Nev. Feb. 14, 1973) (unreported memorandum decision).
3. Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 812 (Mo. 1959). I t is the general tendency of
the contract and not the result in a particular case which determines its validity. State
ex rel. Spillman v. First Bank, 114 Neb. 423, 430, 207 N.W. 674, 676-77 (1926); Enders v.
Enders, 164 Pa. 266, 271, 30 A. 129, 130 (1894).
4. Steele v. Drummond, 275 U.S. 199, 205 (1927); Pendleton v. Greever, 80 Okla. 35,
193 P. 885 (1920); Weeks v. New York Life Ins. Co., 128 S.C. 223, 226-27, 122 S.E. 586,
587 (1924).
Public Policy is in its nature so uncertain and fluctuating, varying with the
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ple of freedom of contract,' the courts have generally been reluctant to invalidate a contract on public policy grounds unless the
policy is clearly inferable from the constitution, statutes, or judiand the effects of the agreement
cial decisions of the jurisdi~tion,~
are clearly within the intended scope of the policy.' In the area
of contracts involving surrender of child custody or consent to
adoption, however, it is well settled that any transaction amounting in substance to the sale of a child violates public policy."
At early common law, contracts for the transfer of child custody were void as against public policy,' even where the consideration for the transfer was exclusively for the benefit of the child?
This policy found expression in two broad rules: (1)children cannot be bought and sold,ll and, (2) parents cannot permanently
transfer the custody of their child to another by their own acts.12
-

habits and fashions of the day, with the growth of commerce and the usages of
trade, that it is difficult to determine its limits with any degree of exactness. It
has never been defined by the courts, but has been let loose and free from
definition in the same manner as fraud.
Pendleton, supra, at 37, 193 P. a t 887.
5. Baltimore and O.S.W.R. Co. v. Voight, 176 U.S. 498, 505-06 (1900); Tschirgi v.
Merchants Nat'l Bank, 253 Iowa 682, 690, 113 N.W.2d 226, 231 (1962) (the courts should
not emasculate the liberty of contract unless imperatively required by the public welfare).
6. Twin City Pipeline Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1931); Weeks
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 128 S.C. 223, 226-27, 122 S.E. 586, 587 (1924).
7. A.C. Frost & Co. v. Couer D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 44 (1941); Twin City
Pipeline Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1931).
8. See, e.g., In re Estate of Shirk, 186 Kan. 311, 323-24, 350 P.2d 1, 11 (1960) ("It is
fundamental that parents may not barter or sell their children nor may they demand
pecuniary gain as the price of consent to adoptions. This is so inherent in the fabric of
American law that citation of authority is unnecessary."); Enders v. Enders, 164 Pa. 266,
OF CONTRACTS
4 583 (1931). But see id. which
272-73, 30 A. 129, 130 (1894); RESTATEMENT
provides in subsection 2 that agreements between parents are not void if for the welfare
of the child, and comment a which states that the entire section is inapplicable if an
adoption is involved.
The sale of children is also forbidden by statute in many jurisdictions. E.g., UTAH
CODEANN. § 76-15-3 (1953). For a detailed discussion of the criminal provisions in the
OF THE
Michigan adoption statute prohibiting the sale of children see M. VIRTUE,STUDY
BASICSTRUCTURE
FOR CHILDREN'S
SERVICES
IN MICHIGAN
182-83 (1953).
9. See, e.g., Swift v. Swift, 55 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ch. 1865) aff'd 34 L.J. Ch. 394
(1865); Hamilton v. Hector, L.R. 6 Ch. App. 701, 704 (1871).
10. See Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111Tex. 122,229 S.W. 1114 (1921) (following the early
common law).
11. See note 8 supra.
12. See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 192-94 (1962) (agreements between parents for
the custody of their children are not binding on the courts); Kelsey v. Green, 69 Conn.
291, 37 A. 679 (1897); Weir v. Marley, 99 Mo. 484, 12 S.W. 798 (1890). But see Clark v.
Clark, 122 Md. 114, 118,89 A. 405, 407 (Ct. App. 1913) (welfare of the child considered to
be more important than strict application of the old common law rule prohibiting private
contractural transfers of custody).
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By discouraging parents from shifting their parental responsibilities to another who had only a contractual obligation to support
the child, but no corresponding moral obligation, it seems that
the courts intended to protect society from additional welfare
costs for the care of abandoned children.13Moreover, since parental custody rights were not considered property interests and children were not chattels, a child was not considered to be the proper
subject of a contract.14
As statutes legalizing adoption became prevalent,lEand the
best interests of the child became the paramount concern in cases
involving the custody of children,16 courts began enforcing contracts to give or will property to the chi1d.l7Even in cases where
the custody of the child is the central issue, the modern trend is
to enforce the contract if it promotes the child's welfare.lWever--

-

-

These cases suggest that the rule was primarily invoked in cases where the custody
of the child was the central issue. See Anderson v. Anderson, 75 Kan. 117, 128, 88 P. 743,
747 (1907) (enforcing a contract to leave property to the child even though the contract
also provided for the transfer of child custody, where the action was not directly concerned
with child custody).
13. See Enders v. Enders, 164 Pa. 266, 272-73, 30 A. 129, 130 (1894).
14. See Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111Tex. 122, 131-32, 229 S.W. 1114, 1118 (1921); Sell,
Custody of Children after Divorce in Pennsylvania, 10 U. PI^. L. REV.1, 6 (1948).
15. Adoption was unknown a t common law. The first adoption statutes in the United
States were enacted in the middle of the nineteenth century. England did not provide for
adoption in its statutes until 1926. See Presser, The Historical Background of the AmeriLAW443 (1971).
can Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAMILY
Nevada's current adoption statute provides that "If the court finds the best interests
of the child warrant the granting of the petition, an order or decree of adoption shall be
made and filed . . . ." NEV.REV.STAT.§ 127.150 (1973).
16. See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962) ("Virginia law, like that of
probably every state in the Union requires the court to put the child's interest first.").
For a discussion of the development of the best interest standard and custody generally see Oster, Custody Proceedings: A Study of Vague and Indefinite Standards, 5 J.
FAMILY
LAW21 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Oster]; Sell, note 14 supra at 1; 17 N.Y.L.F.
875 (1971). The varied development of the law involved in the custody of illegitimate
ILLEGITIMACY:
LAWAND SOCIAL
POLICY(1971).
children is traced in H. KRAUSE,
For a discussion of the effects of Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), on the rights
of the unwed father in a custody hearing see Comment, Adoption Consent Rights of the
Unwed Father in Oregon, 53 ORE.L. REV.531 (1974).
17. Savannah Bank & Trust Co. v. Wolff, 191 Ga. 1 1 1 , l l S.E.2d 766 (1940) (contract
with third party held specifically enforceable); Redmon v. Roberts, 198 N.C. 161, 150 S.E.
881 (1929) (upholding contract between natural parents of illegitimate child); Bassett v.
American Baptist Publication Soc'y 215 Mich. 126, 183 N.W. 747 (1921). Contra, Hooks
v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. 122, 229 S.W. 1114 (1921) (denying specific performance of
contract with third party on grounds that enforcement would encourage widespread sale
of children).
18. Crocker v. Crocker, 195 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1952).
For a critical analysis concerning the conclusionary application by the courts of the
"best interest" or "child's welfare standard" see Foster & Freed, Child Custody, 39
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theless, contracts involving surrender of custody to a third party
without reference to the child's interests or primarily for the pecuniary benefit of the parent continue to be held void as against
public policy.lg The rationale for this approach appears to be the
strong public interest in promoting the welfare of children and in
howmaintaining the natural parent-child relati~nship.~When,
ever, it is apparent that the welfare of the child has been promoted, some courts have permitted the parent to incidentally
benefit from the agreement notwithstanding the general rule that
parents may not profit from the transfer of child custody to another. This narrowly construed exception has been applied only
where the contract involved a close family compact that generally
promoted the child's welfare and the parent relinquishing custody was not motivated by prospects of pecuniary gain.21

B. Nevada Public Policy
Nothing in the Nevada constitution or statutes directly prohibits contracts for the surrender of a child to another or expressly
makes it unlawful for the mother of an illegitimate child to inciN.Y.U.L. REV.423 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Foster & reed]; Oster, supra note 16, a t
22, 37-38.
Generalizations are developed to guide the courts. To decide a question of
custody by mere reference to these generalities without searching the specifics
and stating such findings in the opinion is unsatisfactory. To render an opinion
that the mother should have custody because she is fit tells us . . . nothing
about what made this mother fit. Nor does such an opinion serve as a guide for
the future. . . .
Id. at 37.
19. See, e.g., Savannah Bank & Trust Co. v. Hanley, 208 Ga. 34,65 S.E.2d 26 (1951)
(denying specific performance of promise by sister-in-law to leave a legacy to the child's
mother in return for consent to adoption); Downs v. Wortman 228 Ga. 315, 185 S.E.2d
387 (1971) (returning custody of child to natural parents because a payment to the mother
was against public policy and invalidated the consent); cf. Bilderback v. Clark, 106 Kan.
737, 189 P. 977 (1920) (refusing to enforce an alleged promise to leave the estate to the
natural heirs on the grounds that such a promise was detrimental to the welfare of the
child and contrary to the adoption statutes).
20. Cases cited note 19 supra.
An additional rationale suggested by the district court in the present case is the
fundamental "abjuration of agreements involving the barter or sale of human beings"
provided in the anti-slavery provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment. Civil No. LV-1923,
a t 7.
21. See, e.g., In re Estate of Shirk, 186 Kan. 311,350 P.2d 1 (1960) (contract initiated
by maternal grandmother to leave legacy to mother in return for consent to adoption);
Clark v. Clark, 122 Md. 114, 89 A. 405 (1922) (contract initiated by paternal grandfather
to pay mother's boarding expenses in return for transfer of custody); Enders v. Enders,
164 Pa. 266, 30 A. 129 (1894) (contract initiated by paternal grandfather to give a certain
sum of money to the mother and the child on a specified date).
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dentally profitfrom a custody contract with the child's putative
father. Nevertheless, the Nevada legislature has enacted a cornprehensive adoption statute,22prohibit ing unlicensed persons
from receiving or requesting any compensation for the placement
of children23and providing criminal penalties for violation^.^^
Natural parents, however, are exempted from the licensing req u i r e m e n t ~and
~ ~ penalty provision^.^^ Also, no written notice of
a proposed placement is required by the state's welfare division
if the "child and one of the prospective adoptive parents are
related within the third degree of con~anquinity."~'
The validity of a contract incidental to adoption that provides a pecuniary benefit to the parent relinquishing custody has
never been considered by the Nevada courts. The Nevada Supreme Court in Las Vegas Sun v. Franklin,28however, strongly
suggested that any compensation in a black market setting which
permitted the mother to profit from childbirth would be a sale of
the child and against public

In the instant case the federal district court was confronted
with the problem of determining Nevada public policy without
the aid of specific legislative pronouncement or prior judicial decisions. In concluding that there was a Nevada public policy
against the receipt of any compensation for the placement of a
child, the district court reasoned that the statutes prohibiting any
unlicensed person from receiving compensation for the placement
22. NEV.REV.STAT.$ 4 127.005 et seq. (1973).
23. Id. 4 127.290.
24. Id. § 127.300.
25. Id. 4 127.240.
26. Id. 4 127.300.
27. Id. $3 127.280.
28. 74 Nev. 282, 329 P.2d 867 (1958).
29. Id. a t 291-92, 329 P.2d at 872. This was a libel action in which the Nevada
Supreme Court held that an accusation that an attorney participated in the black market
sale of a child was libel per se. Commenting on the asserted defense of truth because the
mother had been paid for her hospital expenses and lost wages during confinement, the
court said:
We shall not disturb their [the jury's] determination . . . that such compensation did not constitute the transaction a sale. There is nothing to indicate that
the payment permitted the mother to profit from childbirth. To the contrary,
it would seem to have been intended simply to prevent her confinement from
resulting in pecuniary loss.
Id.
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of a child literally applied to the plaintiff." The Nevada Supreme
Court's language in Las Vegas Sun v. Franklin provided a negative inference that the Nevada courts would consider any transaction which permitted the mother to profit from childbirth a sale
of the child and void as against public policy." This conclusion
accorded with the weight of authority in other jurisdiction^."^
Admittedly, there existed a narrowly construed exception allowing a parent to receive incidental profits under special circumstances, but that exception did not properly apply in the instant
case .33
Since the promise to make a will for the mother's benefit was
held by the district court to violate public policy, the dismissal
of the complaint was further justified by the principle of divisibility of contract." The agreement was a partially executed, unilateral contract containing a number of promises made by the father
solely in consideration for the mother's consent to adoption.""
Since the only unperformed promise was the unlawful promise to
the mother, the district court reasoned that it should leave the
parties where it found them.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that no
Nevada public policy against adoption agreements between. the
natural parents could reasonably be inferred from the state con30. Civil No. LV-1923, a t 4-5.
31. Id. a t 5.
32. Id. (citing 59 AM. JUR.2d Parent & Child 4 34 (1971)). B u t see 59 AM.JUR.2d
Parent & Child 4 37 (1971). Apparently the district court failed to distinguish between
(1) cases in which a parent attempts to regain custody of his child after contracting for
the child's transfer to a third party and (2) cases in which the parent attempts to enforce
an incidental promise made by the other party to leave property or money to the parent
or the child in return for the transfer of custody. The section relied on by the district court
merely indicates that in the first category of cases, where custody of the child is the main
issue, the courts do not hold themselves bound by private custody contracts. See notes 12
and 18 supra. On the other hand, section 37 seems to indicate that in the second category,
where enforcement of an incidental promise is the central issue, the courts are more
concerned with the rule that children cannot be bought and sold. Even though concerned
with that rule, however, the courts do not always apply it automatically to invalidate a
contract. Some contracts requiring the party acquiring custody to leave money or property
to the child or to the parent surrendering custody have been judicially enforced. See note
21 and accompanying text supra.
33. Civil No. LV-1923, a t 6.
34. Id. at 7.
35. Id. a t 6-7. The plaintiff, however, alleged that the contract was bilateral, decedent's promises being made in return for her promises, and that more consideration was
given than just the promise to consent to adoption. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint a t 8.
The court concluded that decedent could not have compelled the mother to perform in
light of its finding that an indivisible part of the promised consideration was illegal. Civil
No. LV-1923, at 7.

CASE NOTES

stitution, statutes, or case law. The clear distinction drawn by the
statutes between adoption agreements involving the natural parents and those involving third parties supports this conclusion.
Las Vegas Sun is inapposite in a "situation involving an adoption
agreement between the natural parents of an illegitimate child."3R
Further, the facts of the instant case meet the requirements of the
exception permitting parents to profit in limited circumstances.
Indeed, this exception constitutes the majority rule where there
exists a compact between natural parents. It was, therefore, error
for the district court to conclude that Nevada would reject the
majority rule.37
The Ninth Circuit did not directly respond to the district
court's discussion of divisibility. It did say, however, that more
consideration was involved in the case than the mere consent for
adoption.38

The Ninth Circuit in the present case confronted one crucial,
substantive issue: what standard or test should be applied to
determine the validity of an adoption contract between natural
parents? Before reaching that issue, however, the court was obligated to determine whether the law and public policy of the relevant state jurisdiction, Nevada, already provided clear guidelines
for resolution of the issue which would preclude a relatively independent federal court consideration of precedents from other jurisdictions and relevant policy.
This case note will first evaluate the court's resolution of the
second issue, the presence or absence of controlling Nevada law.
It will then examine the precedents of other jurisdictions bearing
on the substantive issue available to the court and the court's use
of those precedents. Finally, this case note will describe, and
analyze in some detail, the standard or approach adopted by the
court for determining the validity of the adoption contract in the
instant case.

A. Nevada Law and Public Policy
The circuit court correctly concluded that the Nevada adoption statute is not applicable to contracts between the adopted
36. 512 F.2d a t 188.
37. Id. at 189-90.
38. Id. at 188.
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child's natural parents. The legislative history of the act reveals
that it was intended to eliminate the evils and abuses connected
with the black market sale of children and especially the presence
of middlemen or brokers in this baby market.3gThis purpose is
also evident in the language of the act itself. The statute restricts
the activities of attorneys to prevent them from acting as brok e r ~ , requires
'~
persons placing children to be licensed," and provides criminal penalties for the placing of children without a
license and for advertising that children are available for place~ the other hand,
ment or will be accepted for that p ~ r p o s e . 'On
the exemption of natural parents from the licensing requirem e n t ~ and
, ~ ~the waiver of t h e notification requirement if the
proposed adoptive parent is related to the child by blood," demonstrate that contracts between the natural parents or the parents and a close blood relative of the child are not within the
intended scope of the statute.
Although agreements between the natural parents are not
affected by the statute, the prohibition against the receipt of
compensation by unlicensed persons could reasonably be applied
to parents who contract with third parties for the transfer of their
child's custody. Thus, it may be inferred that Nevada public
policy prohibits any profit to the parent resulting from the surrender of custody of his child to a stranger. Such a situation is closely
analogous to the black market situation which the adoption statutes were designed to prevent. The holding of the Nevada Supreme Court in Las Vegas Sun v. Franklin45is in accord with this
39. Mitler, Child Welfare and Adoption in Nevada: A New Law and a New Approach,
NEVADA
LEGISLATIVE
COUNSEL
BUREAU
BULL.NO. 58, a t 31 (1963):
The real question is: was the selection of the adoptive home influenced or
determined by the compensation being given an intermediary of the adoptive
couple? If the sole reason for selecting an adoptive home was the ability of a
couple to pay the intermediary one dollar, social damage has been inflicted.
40. NEV.REV.STAT. 127.285 (1973).
41. Id. $ 127.310.
42. Id.
This statute, read literally, could be applied to the natural parents, but such an
application would be in conflict with $ 127.240 which exempts the natural parents from
the licensing requirements. This legislative oversight suggests that the licensing provisions
of the statute were not intended to apply to agreements between natural parents and that
the district court incorrectly applied the anti-compensation provisions of $ 127.290. See
note 26 and accompanying text supra.
43. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
44. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
45. 74 Nev. 282,329 P.2d 867 (1958). The court defined a black market sale as follows:
Under any reasonable construction of the term, "black market sale" contemplates a sale contrary to regulations with a profit calculated either to compen-
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principle and with the general rule that parents should not be
permitted to profit from the surrender of their child to a third
party without reference to the "child's best interests." Nevertheless, the circuit court properly refused to extend the holding of
Las Vegas S u n to a situation far removed from the black market
context, in which the allegations of the plaintiff indicated that
the welfare of the child was considered by the natural parents and
in fact promoted by the agreement.
By determining that neither Nevada's adoption statute nor
the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in Las Vegas S u n v.
Franklin controlled in the present case, the court left itself relatively free to determine the substantive issue concerning the proper standard to be applied to the alleged contract of adoption. In
making that determination, the court turned both to precedents
from other jurisdictions and to public policy.

B. T h e Application of Precedent
The unique factual setting in the present case made it difficult for both the district and the circuit courts to apply precedent.
The contract involved was more complicated than a simple agreement between the natural parents for the custody and control of
their child because the child was born out of wedlock a t a time
when the parents were both married to other persons.46Furthermore, the courts were unable to find any precedent for a situation
involving an adoption agreement between the natural parents of
an illegitimate child in which the parent relinquishing custody
was monetarily benefited by the contract.
Although the present case is not precisely similar to any
other known case, it is more closely analagous to those cases,
relied on by the circuit court, which have established the narrow
exception permitting parents to incidentally profit from the contract.47Like the contracts in those cases, the contract in the present case was a close family compact, which was found to promote
the welfare of the child; additionally, pecuniary gain was not the
primary motivation for creation of the contract and surrender of
child custody. At the same time, the cases relied on by the district
sate for the risk of apprehension or to match the buyer demand which has
created the market.
Id. at 291-92, 329 P.2d at 872.
46. Letter from Ralph M. Crow, Counsel for Plaintiff, to the Brigham Young University Law Review, October 2, 1975.
47. Cases cited note 21 supra.
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court do not apply as well to the peculiar facts of the present case.
Those cases involved contracts between the parents and third
parties, which were either made without reference to the interests
of the child or by their terms were detrimental to the child's
welfare?
In conclusion, the circuit court neither disregarded nor misapplied precedent in formulating its standard for measuring the
validity of adoption contracts. Rather, the flexible standard
adopted by the court has some support in prior case law.

C. T h e Flexible Standard Adopted by t h e N i n t h Circuit
While it is well settled that contracts for the sale of children
are void as against public policy, the courts have disagreed on the
number and importance of the factors to be considered in arriving
a t the conclusion that a sale has occurred. In attempting to arrive
a t a result consistent with the underlying rationale and fundamental assumptions of the general policy against sales of children, the circuit court was confronted in the present case with the
mutually exclusive theories of the district court and the plaintiff.
The standard adopted by the district court was fairly rigid
and based entirely on the presence of an economic benefit to the
parent releasing custody. Under this approach the only relevant
inquiries are whether there was compensation or a sale price, and
whether the purpose and effect of the compensation resulted in
profit to the parent. The existence of a special relationship between the parties to the contract and the overall effect of the
contract on the welfare of the child had no bearing on the court's
determinati~n.'~
Nevertheless, application of this standard would
not affect statutory adoptions requiring the consent of parents, or
incidental contracts exclusively for the benefit of the child, be48. Cases cited note 19 supra.
Additionally, the circuit court implied that there was an alternative ground for enforcing the contract even if the promise to benefit the mother in return for her consent to
the adoption was invalid as against public policy. This implication or inference arises from
both the statement that there "was other consideration for the payment besides mere
consent to the adoption by the mother" and the court's extended discussion of
consideration concepts. Further discussion by the court of cases in which the mother was
able to regain custody following a prior consent to adoption suggests that the plaintiffs
forbearance to assert her right to reclaim custody of the child was a legal detriment to
her which created sufficient independent consideration to support the father's promise to
make a will. 512 F.2d a t 188-89. Such an argument is difficult to support, however, because
the promise not to regain custody was so closely associated with the consent to adoption
as to be almost indistinguishable.
49. See Civil No. LV-1923, at 5, 7.
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cause neither of these situations involves a monetary profit to the
parent. The justification for this approach appears to be that by
refusing to enforce promises beneficial to the parent the courts
remove the temptation for parents to sacrifice the "best interests
of their child" for their own pecuniary advantage." Although this
rationale is in harmony with the underlying purposes of the public policy, its inflexibility would appear to create a harsh and
oppressive result in some cases.
The standard advanced by the plaintiff1 involved a broad
balancing-of-facts test and lies a t the opposite end of the spectrum from the profit test utilized by the district court. Under the
balancing approach, the child's welfare is the ultimate concern,
and the court is free to examine all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the contract. If the court finds that the contract
promotes the welfare of the child, it will conclude either that the
contract is consistent with public policy or that no invalidating
public policy exists in the particular case.s2 The basis for this
balancing-of-facts test is the paramount concern for the welfare
of the child in any case involving child custody. Extrapolating
this approach to its logical conclusion, if the parent intended to
sell the child for profit and was solely motivated by this purpose,
the contract would be enforced if found to promote the child's
welfare.
The Ninth Circuit did not adopt either of these two standards; rather, it adopted an intermediate approach which it summarized in these terms:
It is not against public policy t o enforce an agreement to provide
for the mother of an illegitimate child in the putative father's
will, incidental to an agreement to permit the adoption of the
child by its father, where the adoption was in the best interests
of the child and pecuniary gain was not the motivating factor
on the mother's part.53

This standard permits the court the flexibility necessary to evaluate all the factors relating to the child's welfare while providing
important safeguards against abuse by limiting the applicability
of the test to special fact situations. The contract will be enforced
-

-

--

p

p

50. 512 F.2d a t 199 (Koelsch, J., dissenting). The argument is made that financial
consideration to the mother may "buy a blind spot to qualities in the adoptive parent
harmful to the child" which is contrary to the responsibility the statutes place on the
mother to make a wise choice of adoptive parents for her child.
51. See Brief for Appellant a t 18.
52. Id.
53. 512 F.2d a t 189.
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only where it involves a close family compact, actually promotes
the child's welfare, and is not primarily motivated by the prospect of pecuniary gain.
The first condition, that the contract must be a close family
compact, is not a dispositive factor, but a threshold requirement
which must be satisfied before the court may look a t the other
facts and circumstances in the case. Thus, contracts between
parents and third parties remain subject to the more rigid "profit
test" adopted by the district court. There are sound reasons for
such a distinction. First, common experience indicates that contracts between parents and strangers are more likely to be
associated with the evils and abuses of the black market which
the law attempts to prevent.54Second, the close relationship of
the parties to one another and to the child creates a strong inference that the welfare of the child was not only considered but was
the object of the contract. Third, close family members have a
moral obligation to support the child. Moreover, and this is important in the present case, the Nevada statute imposes a corresponding legal obligation for support on both parents of an illegitimate child." Fourth, in contracts between the natural parents,
a special relationship is present that is consistent both with the
public interest in maintaining the natural family relationship and
with the public policy that favors the support of children by their
natural fathers." Adoption by the putative father also removes
the stigma of illegitimacy.
The second condition in the test adopted by the Ninth Circuit is that the contract for adoption or transfer of custody must
have actually promoted the child's welfare. In determining
whether this condition has been satisfied, the court should follow
the extensive fact-finding and balancing process employed in
hearings for custody or adoption decrees." This inquiry should
54. Three states do not permit a parent to privately place his child for adoption unless
the prospective adoptive parent is a close blood relative of the child. CONN.GEN.STAT.
REV.§ 45:63 (1975); DEL. CODEANN.tit. 13, 5 904 (1974); MINN.STAT.ANN.4 259.22
(1974). Arguably, the purpose of these provisions is to control the black market sale of
LAWREP. 2104 (Dec. 10, 1974).
children. See also 1 FAMILY
55. NEV.REV.STAT.§ § 126.030 et seq. (1973).
56. See Schumm v. Berg, 37 Cal.2d 174, 231 P.2d 39 (1951); Miller v. Miller, 335
S.W.2d 884 (Ct. App. Ky. 1960); Peterson v. Eritsland, 69 Wash. 2d 588, 419 P.2d 332
(1966).
57. While this fact-finding process is the same as if the court were deciding who
should receive custody of the child, the purpose is different. Since cases involving contracts incidental to adoption agreements usually arise long after the custody of the child
has been transferred, the court does not actually protect the welfare of the child in the
particular case, but rather, uses this as an indication of whether the relinquishing parent
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include such factors as the financial and social status of the parties, but neither these nor any other individual factors should be
given conclusive weight. The obvious weakness in relying
exclusively on this test is the lack of specific guidelines concerning the meaning of "best interests." In the present case, however,
the tremendous financial advantages and apparent social benefits
accruing to the child by reason of the contract appeared sufficient
to justify a remand for trial on the merits.5R
The third condition is that the parent relinquishing custody
must not be primarily motivated by the prospect of pecuniary
gain. This means that the welfare of the child must have been
promoted as the result of a conscious effort on the part of the
parent to that end, rather than as the by-product of chance or
good fortune. The purpose of this requirement is to insure that
the parent surrendering custody has placed the welfare of the
child above all other considerations and that the prospect of a
pecuniary advantage has not colored his judgement about the
welfare of the child." In the present case, the allegation that the
contract was initiated by the father evidenced a lack of selfseeking on the part of the mothera60
IV.

CONCLUSION

Since public policy should not be applied to invalidate a
contract unless the effects of the agreement are clearly within the
intended scope of that policy, the circuit court correctly refused
to adopt a rigid or blanket test for determining whether contracts
incidental to adoption agreements between the natural parents
are contrary to public policy. While profit to the parent should
sold the child, oblivious to its welfare, or actually entered into the transaction to promote
the child's welfare.
58. Oster, supra note 16, a t 22, has attempted to list some of the criteria which courts
have developed to determine the child's best interests. The list includes: child preference;
mental and physical health of the child; sex, age, and fitness of the parent including moral
fitness; love and affection of the parent for the child; and the parent's ability to provide
for the child physically, mentally, and financially. For a criticism of the court's use of
these guidelines see note 18 supra.
Foster & Freed, supra note 18, a t 438, concluded from a study of court decisions that
the criteria used to determine best interests "are inadequate [because] they fail to force
courts to consider essential factual, social, medical, and psychological information." For
a well-written discussion illustrating proper and improper applications of the child's best
interests standard see Foster, Adoption and Child Custody: Best Interests of the Child?,
22 BUFFALO
L. REV.1 (1973). For a discussion of proposed criteria focusing on the child's
economic and educational security and emotional stability see 34 LA.L. REV.881 (1974).
59. See note 50 supra.
60. 512 F.2d a t 189.
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be considered as one factor in assessing the validity of such agreements, in cases where the contract promotes the welfare of the
child, and the mother was not primarily motivated by pecuniary
gain, courts should be allowed greater flexibility to determine
whether the incidental profit to the parent falls within the intended scope of the public policy. This flexible approach is supported by sound precedent and, if accompanied by an extensive
fact-finding process, will serve both to protect the public interest
against the sale of children and to achieve justice by enforcing
contracts which do not violate the public policy. In light of the
increased likelihood, however, that the presence of profit in adoption contracts with third parties would affect the parent's assessment of the "best interests of the child," application of the flexible standard should be limited, as it was by the circuit court in
the present case, to cases involving close family compacts.

